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HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 Appellant, Ethel R. Leecan ("Mrs. Leecan"), appeals a 
declaratory judgment of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in favor of appellee, Clifford 
Irene Huff ("Huff").  This district court's judgment declared 
that Huff was the legal spouse of William N. Leecan ("Mr. Leecan" 
or "the decedent") at the time of his death.  Both women claimed 
entitlement to decedent's federal employee survivor benefits as 
his surviving spouse.  This case arose when the Director of the 
United States Office of Personnel Management ("USOPM") requested 
both claimants to file this action asking the district court to 
judicially determine who was Mr. Leecan's spouse at the time of 
his death. 
 For purposes of determining who is a spouse entitled to 
survivors' benefits, USOPM looks to applicable state law.  It 
will apply the law of the state with the most significant 
interest in the marital status of the employee.  The only two 
states whose law could apply to the dispute between Mrs. Leecan 
and Huff are Pennsylvania and Texas.  We believe that 
Pennsylvania law would control in this case, as it has the 
greater interest in the marital status of the now deceased 
government employee.  The district court did not do a choice of 
laws analysis but concluded instead that the outcome would be the 
 
 
same under either Texas or Pennsylvania law.  It then looked to 
Pennsylvania case law and held that Huff was the legal spouse of 
the decedent at the time of Mr. Leecan's death absent proof of 
divorce or annulment of his marriage to her. 
 We think that the district court erred in analyzing 
Pennsylvania law and concluding that Pennsylvania has an 
absolutely inflexible rule that a second marriage is always 
invalid in the absence of strict proof of a divorce decree or 
annulment of the first marriage.  The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania has specifically instructed courts applying that 
state's domestic relations law to perform a balancing test by 
weighing the evidence in the record to determine which of two 
presumptions, one in favor of continuation of the first marriage 
and the other in favor of the validity of the second marriage, is 
more easily sustained by the evidence.  Concluding that the 
second presumption could never apply in the absence of strict 
formal proof of termination of the first marriage, the district 
court failed to do this.  Therefore, we will remand this case to 
the district court so that it can properly balance the 
presumption in favor of the first marriage against the one 
favoring the second.  In adjusting that balance, we think no 
mechanical rule will suffice.  Instead, we think the court should 
consider the conduct of both parties and their respective 
contributions to the stability of the family each chose to 
support or deny in light of the value our society attributes to 
traditional families and evolving conditions of family life in 
this nation.  On remand, we also think the district court should 
 
 
make an express finding as to when and how Huff first learned of 
the decedent's marriage to Mrs. Leecan and the reasons for her 
lack of curiosity for twenty-eight years about the man she now 
claims as her husband. 
 
 I. 
 Huff and the decedent were married in 1956 in Victoria 
County, Texas.1  Shortly thereafter, they moved to Philadelphia.  
They had no children together.  In 1961, they separated and Huff 
returned to Victoria County, Texas.  Huff continued her residence 
there until 1964 when she moved to Houston in Harris County, 
Texas.  The decedent continued to live in Philadelphia.  In 1962, 
Huff commenced divorce proceedings against the decedent in 
Victoria County, Texas.  The action was dismissed for lack of 
prosecution in 1964.  A record search of Victoria and Harris 
Counties, Texas, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania produced no 
record of divorce or annulment.2 
                     
1.  Mrs. Leecan argues that Huff's marriage to the decedent was 
invalid because Huff was only seventeen years of age at the time.  
This impediment renders the marriage merely voidable, not void.  
Because Huff did not, at any time, disclose this impediment to 
the district court and because a declaratory judgment is an 
equitable remedy, Mrs. Leecan also argues that Huff should be 
precluded from recovery because she did not come into court with 
clean hands.  Huff and the decedent continued to live together as 
husband and wife after Huff attained the age of majority, and no 
action for annulment was commenced within sixty days of the 
marriage ceremony.  See 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 3303, 
3305(a)(2) (1991).  Therefore, we reject these arguments. 
2.  Texas law requires a plaintiff in a divorce action to have 
resided in the county where the action was filed for six months 
prior to institution of the action. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 
 
 
 Huff later took up residence with Thomas Bennett and 
had three children with him, all bearing the surname Bennett.  On 
the children's birth certificates, Huff's name is given as Irene 
Bennett.  Huff never married Bennett. 
 Following his separation from Huff, the decedent was 
hired by the United States Post Office in Philadelphia.  His 
employment there entitled his spouse to federal survivor annuity 
benefits.  On November 8, 1967, the decedent completed his death 
benefit form naming Ethel Leecan as his wife.  Three days later, 
on November 11, 1967, the decedent and Ethel Leecan, after 
obtaining a Pennsylvania marriage license, were married.3  The 
decedent, in applying for the marriage license, declared that he 
had never been married before.  Following their marriage, the 
decedent and Mrs. Leecan held themselves out as husband and wife, 
bought property together and had two children together.4  
 Decedent died in an automobile accident in June of 
(..continued) 
§ 3.21 (West 1994).  Huff appears to have resided only in Harris 
and Victoria Counties, Texas. 
]3.  Decedent's designation of "Ethel Leecan" as his beneficiary 
would be ineffective if she is not his wife.  Only spouses and 
certain unmarried children are entitled to death benefits under 
the Federal Employees Health Benefit's Program.  See 5 U.S.C.A. 
§ 8341 (West Supp. 1994).  Indeed, the Death Benefits 
Registration Form in which decedent listed his spouse as 
"Ethel R." identified the family member eligible for death 
benefits.  See Appendix ("App.") at Doc. 14. 
4.  The ages of the decedent's children do not appear in the 
record.  If we assume that any children born to Mr. and Mrs. 
Leecan were born after the date of Mr. Leecan's attempt to 
contract a valid ceremonial marriage to Mrs. Leecan in 1967 and 
the decedent's death in 1971, these children would today be 
between the ages of 23 and 27. 
 
 
1971.  Later that same year Mrs. Leecan began collecting 
survivors' benefits as his spouse.  Not until about eighteen 
years later, in 1989, did Huff petition the USOPM to award her 
any survivors' benefits due Mr. Leecan's spouse.5  Thus, Huff and 
Mrs. Leecan now both claim entitlement to benefits as the legal 
spouse decedent at the time of his death.  Initially, USOPM 
awarded Huff a retroactive payment of $58,819.20 and ordered Mrs. 
Leecan to repay the benefits she had received over the eighteen 
years that preceded Huff's petition, but USOPM reversed this 
decision after deciding that Huff had waited too long to 
challenge decedent's marriage to Mrs. Leecan and ordered Huff to 
repay the retroactive award. 
 At the urging of USOPM, both parties filed an action in 
the district court seeking a declaratory judgment determining who 
was the legal spouse of the decedent under applicable state law 
at the time of his death.  USOPM suspended all benefit payments 
and efforts to collect repayments pending the district court's 
decision. 
 Huff filed a motion for summary judgment which the 
district court denied, holding that there was sufficient evidence 
at the summary judgment stage to overcome Pennsylvania's 
presumption of favoring the continued existence of the first 
marriage.  This evidence included testimony that the decedent 
believed he had been divorced, that he told others he had 
                     
5.  Applications for survivor annuities may be filed within 
thirty years of the death of an employee.  See 5 U.S.C.A. 
§ 8345(i)(2) (1980). 
 
 
obtained a divorce from Huff, that he had children with Mrs. 
Leecan, and that Huff never attempted to contact the decedent 
until eighteen years after the decedent's death and almost 
twenty-eight years after her separation from him. 
 Later, at a bench trial, other evidence showed the 
decedent told Mrs. Leecan he had been married previously but that 
this marriage had been annulled and decedent's half-brother also 
testified that the decedent had told him before he married Mrs. 
Leecan that his marriage to Huff had been annulled.  He also 
testified that Mr. Leecan had hosted a party to celebrate his 
annulment. 
 Unfortunately for Mrs. Leecan, the district court did 
not credit this testimony, but found instead there was no 
credible evidence that the decedent and Huff were ever divorced 
or that their marriage was ever annulled.  The district court did 
not expressly find that Huff lacked knowledge of Mr. Leecan's 
subsequent marriage to Mrs. Leecan but did find, "she had not had 
any contact with him or any knowledge about him since prior to 
his death in 1971."  Appendix ("App.") at Exhibit 4, p.6 
(District Court oral op.). 
 Mrs. Leecan did not raise any conflict of law issues 
before the district court, nor did she or Mrs. Huff object to the 
district court's application of Pennsylvania law to the question 
of who was Mr. Leecan's spouse at the time of his death.  The 
district court, without deciding whether Texas or Pennsylvania 
law applied, concluded that the outcome would have been the same 
under the law of either state. 
 
 
 Because there was no evidence that the decedent and 
Huff were ever divorced, or that their marriage had been 
annulled, the district court held that Mr. Leecan's second 
marriage to Ethel Leecan was void ab initio.  It went on to 
conclude that Huff was still legally married to the decedent at 
the time of his death but noted, "[t]his result may seem 
inequitable under the facts of this case."  Id. at Exhibit 4, 
p.7. 
 Mrs. Leecan filed a timely notice of appeal.6 
 
                     
6.  The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1332 because of diversity of citizenship.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction over Leecan's appeal from the district 
court's final order granting the declaratory judgment under 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the district 
court's decision that no conflict of laws analysis was required 
and that under the law of Pennsylvania Huff was the legal spouse 
of the decedent at the time of his death.  Epstein Family 
Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1994).  
Any subsidiary factual findings, however, are subject to the 




 In deciding who is entitled to federal survivor 
benefits, USOPM looks to state common law to define marriage and 
to determine who is the legal widow of the decedent: 
 "Marriage" means a marriage recognized in law 
or equity under the whole of the jurisdiction 
with the most significant interest in the 
marital status of the employee, Member or 
retiree unless the law of that jurisdiction 
is contrary to the public policy of the 
United States.  If a jurisdiction would 
recognize more than one marriage in law or 
equity, the Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM) will recognize only one marriage, but 
will defer to the local court to determine 
which marriage should be recognized. 
 
 
5 C.F.R. § 831.603 (1994) (emphasis added).  The only question 
before us on appeal of this declaratory judgment action is who 
was the legal spouse of William Leecan when he died in 1971. 
 In deciding this issue, we agree with the district 
court that it is unnecessary to perform a conflicts analysis as 
the result is the same under either Texas or Pennsylvania law.  
Compare In re Estate of Watt, 185 A.2d 781, 785-86 (Pa. 1962) 
(discussed infra) with Parson v. Parson, 387 S.W.2d 764, 766 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (if previous marriage has not been 
terminated by divorce, annulment or death of prior spouse, party 
does not have capacity to enter into second marriage and any 
attempted second marriage is void ab initio); Hudspeth v. 
Hudspeth, 198 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) (Texas law 
presumes validity of second marriage and that presumption 
prevails until it is rebutted "by evidence which negatives the 
 
 
effective operation of every possible means by which a 
dissolution of the prior marriage could have taken place"); see 
also 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1702 (1991); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 
§ 2.22 (West 1994). 
 In any event, to the extent that there are any material 
differences in the law of Texas and Pennsylvania, we believe 
standard conflicts analysis points to Pennsylvania law.  
Pennsylvania had the "most significant interest in the marital 
status of the employee."  5 C.F.R. § 831.603 (1994) (emphasis 
added).  Although Huff and the decedent were married in Texas, 
they moved to Pennsylvania shortly after their marriage in 1956 
and they resided here until their separation in 1961.  Mrs. 
Leecan's marriage to the decedent occurred in Pennsylvania and 
they resided there until decedent died.  In addition, the 
decedent's federal employment was in Pennsylvania.  The only 
contacts with Texas are Huff's marriage to Leecan and Huff's 
longtime residence there.  See Headon v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 252 
F.2d 739, 742-43 (3d Cir. 1958) (giving great weight to forum 
state's presumptions where parties lived in forum during most of 
marital relationship). 
 Pennsylvania law has two conflicting presumptions, both 
of which apply in this case.  The first presumption is that a 
valid first marriage continues until it is proven to be dissolved 
by death, divorce or annulment.  Watt, 185 A.2d at 785.  The 
second presumes the innocence and validity of a second marriage.  
Id.  In case a conflict between these presumptions arises, we are 
advised "that presumption should yield which from the evidence 
 
 
and inferences therefrom render it the least probable to 
sustain."  Id. at 786.7 
 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered the impact 
of these two presumptions in In re Estate of Watt.  In Watt, in 
upholding the first marriage, the supreme court stated that any 
subsequent marriage is void unless the first marriage is 
dissolved in some manner.  Id. at 785.  It went on to say that 
even assuming the second wife "acted in the utmost of good faith 
and in reliance upon [a fraudulent] decree of divorce, per se 
such good faith and reliance on her part would not breathe 
vitality into her marriage to decedent unless, in fact, decedent 
had the legal capacity to enter into such a marriage."  Id.  
Therefore, to overcome the first presumption, there must be proof 
of facts and circumstances that make it apparent that the first 
marriage has been dissolved or the spouse has died.  Id.; see In 
re Estate of Henry, 353 A.2d 812, 813-15 (Pa. 1976) (because 
there was no evidence of divorce between deceased and his first 
wife or that deceased's first wife died prior to deceased's 
second marriage, first marriage was valid unless during trial, on 
remand from grant of summary judgment, second wife could prove 
that first marriage had never been consummated and decedent had 
never lived together with first wife, as she alleged). 
                     
7.  Texas law also presumes the validity of the second marriage, 
but that presumption is destroyed by evidence which negates the 
effective operation of every possible means by which dissolution 
of the prior marriage could have taken place.  See Hudspeth, 198 
S.W.2d at 770 (citations omitted). 
 
 
 At the same time, the supreme court recognized that it 
had to reconcile this presumption in favor of the continuing 
validity of the first marriage with a competing presumption:  
"the presumption of innocence in contracting a second marriage as 
well as the presumption of the validity of a second marriage, the 
former furnishing the rationale for the latter."  Watt, 185 A.2d 
at 785.  "Underlying [these latter] presumptions is the theory 
that parties to the second marriage did so innocently and without 
criminal or wrongful purpose or intent and that the law will 
infer matrimony rather than concubinage."  Id.  Where children 
have been born of the second marriage, as in Mrs. Leecan's case, 
the presumption of legitimacy considerably strengthens the 
presumption of the validity of the second marriage.  Id. at 785 
n.6.  The birth of children is not sufficient, in itself, 
however, to rebut the presumption in favor of the continuing 
validity of the first marriage.  See In re Estate of Henry, 353 
A.2d at 814; see also Johnson v. J.H. Terry & Co., 126 A.2d 793, 
797 (Pa. Super. 1956), aff'd, 133 A.2d 234 (Pa. 1957).  A long 
period of absence or desertion, as well as the fact that the 
first spouse may have also remarried, and proof that the decedent 
recognized the validity of the second marriage, may also support 
the second presumption.  See In re Estate of D'Ippolito, 218 A.2d 
224, 225 (Pa. 1966) (where twenty-four year period elapsed 
between time decedent was deserted by her first husband and her 
second marriage, and where whereabouts of first husband continued 
to be unknown and decedent had attempted to locate him prior to 
her second marriage, continuance of decedent's first marriage, so 
 
 
as to defeat second husband's right to decedent's estate, was not 
established). 
 In deciding how to balance these conflicting 
presumptions the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Watt, cited 
Madison v. Lewis, 30 A.2d 357, 360 (Pa. Super. 1943), with 
approval. 
 "When a valid marriage is proven the law 
presumes that it continues until the death of 
one of the parties (actual or presumptive 
after seven years), or a divorce is shown.  
Without either of these appearing if one of 
the parties marries again, while another 
presumption arises that it is innocent, that 
alone is not sufficient to overcome the 
previously existing presumption of the 
continued validity of the first marriage.  
The second presumption does not of itself 
destroy the first but requires some proof of 
facts and circumstances to be given the 
effect of overcoming the first; as for 
instance, the long lapse of time during which 
the other party may be presumed to have died, 
the question of legitimacy of a child of the 
second marriage, the fact that the other 
spouse had likewise remarried, proof that the 
decedent, whose heirs are attacking the 
second marriage, had himself recognized the 
validity of it." 
 
 
Watt, 185 A.2d at 785-86 (quoting Madison, 30 A.2d at 360) 
(footnote & citations omitted); cf. In re Estate of Bruce, 538 
A.2d 923, 923 (Pa. Super. 1988).  In our case there is evidence 
that the decedent himself had recognized the second marriage as 
valid, two children were born of the second marriage, there was a 
long lapse of time, approximately twenty-eight years, during 
which the decedent and Huff had no contact with one another, and 
 
 
Huff lived with another man, used his surname and had children 
with him. 
 The Watt court continued: 
 From the presumption in favor of the validity 
of the second marriage and the presumption of 
innocence upon the part of the parties to 
that marriage there follows, as a corollary, 
another presumption i. e. that either death 
or divorce had terminated the prior marriage, 
and he who claims the invalidity of the 
second marriage must over come that . . . 
presumption by proof of some nature.  The 
presumption that a first marriage has been 
terminated by death or divorce is neither 
absolute nor inflexible and each case must be 
resolved on the basis of its own facts and 
circumstances and such inferences as fairly 
arise and can be reasonably drawn from them. 
 
 
Watt, 185 A.2d at 786 (citations omitted). 
 We believe the real thrust of the several presumptions 
is to place the burden of proving the invalidity of the second 
marriage upon the person who claims such invalidity and we think 
that requires proof of some nature that the first marriage was 
not dissolved by death or divorce at the time of the second 
marriage.  Id. at 785-86; but see Headen v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 
252 F.2d at 741 ("The validity of the marriage in question [the 
second marriage] may be sustained only if there is proof of the 
dissolution of [the first marriage]."); D'Ippolito, 218 A.2d at 
225 ("[T]he burden remains upon the party supporting the validity 
of the subsequent marriage to produce such facts as will shift 
the burden of proof back to the party supporting the validity of 
the prior marriage.").  While Pennsylvania cases exhibit 
 
 
considerable confusion about who has the burden of proving the 
termination of the first marriage and the strength of the 
evidence that is needed to establish that fact, they indicate to 
us the absence of an entirely mechanical rule and, under the 
circumstances of this case, we believe that Huff should bear the 
burden of proving the first marriage was not dissolved at the 
time of the second marriage. 
 As the district court recognized in denying Huff's 
motion for summary judgment, there is evidence which could 
overcome the presumption of the continued existence of the first 
marriage.  This evidence includes the fact that the decedent 
advised others that he had obtained a divorce from Huff, Mrs. 
Leecan and the decedent had two children together in the second 
marriage and Huff bore decedent no children.  Huff used the 
surname of her children's father, a man with whom she lived, in 
her correspondence with USOPM and on the birth certificates of 
her children, and Huff never attempted to contact the decedent 
until eighteen years after his death and twenty-eight years after 
their separation.  The district court nevertheless declined to 
balance the conflicting presumptions but instead held if there is 
no divorce decree or annulment of the first marriage, the second 
is automatically void ab initio.  We think this reading of 
Pennsylvania law renders the second presumption meaningless; no 
weighing of the evidence is even necessary because a second 
marriage automatically becomes void ab initio unless a decree of 
divorce or annulment is produced.  This seems to us contrary to 
the state supreme court's analysis in Watt.  Because there was 
 
 
evidence supporting each presumption, we think that the district 
court should have weighed one against the other in light of the 
social value of each claimant's conduct and the contribution of 
each to the family which Mr. Leecan wanted to benefit with funds 
which he treated as his own after Mrs. Huff returned to Texas and 
entered into a relationship with another man that produced a 
separate family which Mr. Leecan not only had no contact with, 
but knew nothing about.  Rather than weighing the competing 
presumptions favoring Mr. Leecan's first and second marriages, as 
suggested by Watt, the district court ended its analysis with a 
rule of law that no divorce or termination of the first marriage 
had been proven and therefore the second marriage was void ab 
initio.  We do not criticize the district court for doing so 
because there are indeed indications in Pennsylvania case law 
that such a strict rule exists, and we recognize the strong need 
for certainty and definiteness in the rules governing a status so 
important to society's well being as marriage.  Nevertheless, it 
seems to us that inflexible application of a rule requiring, 
without exception, that the first marriage be shown conclusively 
to terminate before the second can be recognized would make the 
competing presumption in favor of the validity of the second 
marriage meaningless.  Because that presumption also has strong 
underpinnings in desirable social policy, we do not think 
Pennsylvania would totally ignore it under the circumstances that 
this case presents. 
 Moreover, the district court may have erred in 
concluding that Huff had conclusively demonstrated that no 
 
 
divorce or annulment existed based only upon a search of the 
court records in Victoria and Harris Counties, Texas and 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  In Pennsylvania, there is no six-
month residency requirement as in Texas and the requirement of 
venue may be waived by entry of a general appearance by 
defendant, see Chasman v. Chasman, 53 A.2d 876 (Pa. Super. 1947); 
see also Shields v. Folsom, 153 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Pa. 1957).  
This record does not show that all counties in Pennsylvania were 
searched to establish conclusively that there was no divorce or 
annulment here.  Thus, although the evidence shows that Huff 
resided only in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and Victoria and 
Harris Counties, Texas, we are not convinced that the record 
search Huff offered was broad enough to be conclusive. 
 Finally, even assuming Huff can establish on remand 
that no divorce or annulment exists and the district court 
concludes the presumptions balance in her favor, we believe it 
also erred in failing to make a finding as to when Huff learned 
of the decedent's marriage to Mrs. Leecan.  California and Texas 
law persuasively support the equitable principles that Watt seems 
to foreshadow and later Pennsylvania law does not preclude.  
USOPM decisions concerning entitlement use similar principles.  
Thus, USOPM may bar the first wife from asserting a claim as the 
legal surviving spouse where she unreasonably delayed taking 
legal action to challenge the validity of her husband's later 
marriage within a reasonable time after gaining knowledge of it.  
See Jacobs v. Office of Personnel Management, 13 M.S.P.R. 23, 26 
(1982) (citing United States v. George-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92, 
 
 
96 (9th Cir. 1970); Brown v. Brown, 79 Cal. Rptr. 257 (Cal. App. 
1969), modified, 82 Cal. Rptr. 238 (Cal App. 1969)); see also 
Simpson v. Simpson, 380 S.W.2d 855, 859-60 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).  
We agree that Huff would not be barred from challenging the 
validity of the second marriage if she knew only that the 
decedent "had a woman."  Brief of Appellant at 11.  This is 
clearly insufficient under Watt.  See Watt, 185 A.2d at 790 n.9.  
The district court, however, failed to make any finding on when 
Huff learned of decedent's second marriage.  For all these 
reasons, we conclude this case should be remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings.8 
 
 III. 
 For the foregoing reasons we will vacate the order of 
the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
                     
8.  We note that the district court was itself troubled by the 
length of time between the decedent's death and Huff's claim of 
entitlement to the survivor benefits as well as the inequitable 
result if Mrs. Leecan were now ordered to repay the $58,819.20 
she was previously awarded through no fault or bad faith on her 
part.  Thus, the equitable doctrines of laches and equitable 
estoppel, as well as waiver of overpayment under OPM regulations, 
may be applicable in fashioning a final benefits award even if 
the district court concludes after balancing the conflicting 
presumptions in light of all the evidence that Mrs. Huff has 
established a continuing validity of the marriage to Mr. Leecan 
and the consequent invalidity of his second marriage to Mrs. 
Leecan. 
